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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the effect of unions on efficiency by estimating cost
function systems over three different sets of construction projects. The
results show that union contractors have greater economies of scale. This gives
them a cost advantage in large commercial office buildings, but in school and
hospital construction, nonunion contractors have lower costs at all output
levels. Despite the cost differences, profits for nonunion contractors in
school and hospital construction are no higher than those for union contractors
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I. INTRODUCTION
Although a number of studies have found productivity to be higher in
unionized establishments and industries, the net effect of unions on efficiency
depends on the interaction of the effects of unions on wages and productivityJ
This paper examines how unions affect three widely accepted measures of
efficiency- -cost, profit, and price- -over three different samples of
construction projects.2 The cost results are obtained with translog cost
function systems, an econometric technique which has been applied frequently to
labor demand questions but not, surprisingly, to the question of how unions
affect efficiency.
The cost function results provide new insights into how union and nonunion
firms can compete in the same market. Despite recent declines in percent
unionized in construction, the largest projects still tend to be built by union
contractors, a phenomenon frequently attributed to threats of violent behavior
or political favoritism. In both data sets where economies of scale are
present, I find that these economies of scale are more prevalent in the union
sample. In a sample of commercial office buildings, higher wages price union
contractors out of the market for smaller projects, but greater scale economies
enable them to produce larger projects more efficiently than nonunion
contractors. However, in a sample of elementary and secondary schools, costs
are much higher under unionism at all output levels despite the difference in
economies of scale.
Unions do not seem to reduce profits in construction. This happens even
in the cases where costs per square foot are higher because these costs are
passed on to project owners in the form of higher prices. Geographic market
segmentation, which probably results from prevailing wage legislation, keeps2
union and nonunion profit rates equal despite the price differences in these
cases.
II. METHODOLOGICAL CONCERNS
The relative efficiency of union and nonunion contractors can be estimated
with either cost or profit functions. If the demand for structuresby owners
is exogenous and contractors are cost minimizing price-takers in factor
markets, the cost function approach holding factor prices and outputconstant,
is most appropriate. In this framework unions have twotypes of effects on
efficiency: cost function parameters can vary by union status and, for a
given set of cost function parameters, higher union wages increase costs at all
levels of output.
Alternatively, output could be endogenous either in terms of the number of
projects demanded by owners or the magnitude of a given project. In eithercase
a profit function can be used to simultaneously model profits, inputdemand,
and output supply. In this context, unions can influenceprices in the product
market as well as the production possibilities set andwages. Clark [1984] has
argued that the net effect of unions on efficiency is much more difficult to
predict in this context, even if unions raise labor productivity andwages by
equal amounts. The net effect depends on whether contractors are on or off the
labor demand curve and whether labor ormanagement has more bargaining power.
What are the methodological advantages of estimating the dualcost or profit
functions rather than the production function? In practice mostproduction
function studies have used functional forms which impose restrictionson
technology, such as homogeneity, homotheticity, and identical (frequently
unitary) elasticities of substitution for all pairs of inputs. These
restrictions need not hold and, if production functionparameters vary by3
union status, this could lead to biased estimates of the effect of unions on
technical efficiency. By using flexible functional forms for the cost and
profit functions, these restrictions can be tested and the sensitivity of the
union coefficients to these restrictions can be established.
Of course, such tests could also be done with flexible functional forms
for production functions (although only Clark [1980] and Allen [1984] report
doing such tests), but this raises a more fundamental question. An OLS
production function is appropriate only when input quantities are uncorrelated
with omitted variables. When managers choose the quantity of capital, labor
and other inputs, this choice must be sensitive to the presence of unions as
well as unobserved variables, many of which are likely to be correlated with
union status. This classic identification problem vanishes when estimating
cost or profit functions in construction. Collective bargaining agreements are
usually signed between a local union representing a certain trade or group of
trades and an employer association. The agreement sets the price of labor to
be hired by any union contractor, but contractors are generally free to hire as
much or as little labor as they want on any project.
A convenient aspect of cost and profit functions is that they produce a
direct estimate of the net effect of unions on efficiency. If output is not
homogeneous with respect to input, this estimate can be allowed to vary with
output. In contrast, the effect of unions on efficiency can be estimated only
indirectly in the production function approach by comparing union coefficients
from production and wage equations. Such comparisons are difficult to make in
a statistical sense because these equations always contain different control
variables and are usually estimated at different levels of aggregation.
Conceptually, such comparisons are difficult to interpret in light of the4
complexities about efficient contracts and bargaining power noted by Clark
[1984]
Despite these attractive features, an important problem remains --
measurementerror. The exogenous variables in cost and profit functions are
output (in cost functions only), fixed inputs, and factor prices. In cross
section data, prices of nonlabor inputs are not generally reported, resulting
in an errors in variables problem. Because of the restrictions required to
assure homogeneity of degree one of cost with respect to factor prices and
symmetry in cross partial effects of factor prices on costs, the direction and
magnitude of the bias resulting from this measurement error cannot be
predicted. Such bias is also present in production function estimates,
especially for capital input, labor quality, and in many cases, the union
coefficient but cross- or within-equation restrictions are not involved.
The cost and profit functions also do not provide any guidelines for
distinguishing between what Freeman and Medoff [1981] call the price theoretic
and the institutional effects of unions. Any union-nonunion difference in
parameter estimates will reflect both of these factors. Unless there are
perfect controls for capital intensity and labor quality, this will also be
true for union coefficients in production functions.
III. SPECIFICATION
The translog functional form was selected for the cost equation because it
imposes relatively few restrictions on the parameters of interest.3 In the
single output case, the function is written
lnC +aymY +.5i3yy(lnY)2+E/3YimY 1nP +aFlnF+
+ flYFmY lnF +/3FilnF lnP +Ecr lnP1+.5E
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where C =variablecost, Y =output,Ffixed inputs and P price of
variable input i. A three factor specification is used in the results reported
below--labor (L), materials (M), and capital (K). Two sets of restrictions
from production theory are imposed in all cases: (1) symmetry, which requires
that ,8jj= i9jjand (2) homogeneity of degree one with respect to prices, which
requires that
=1;EPYi =0;E/3Fi =0;Sjj = = EEi9ij=0
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Shephard'slemma states that 8C/3P =X.In logarithmic terms, this
becomes
8lnC/ 8lnP =PX/C=Si,
where S is the share of factor i in total cost. If the cost function is (1),
the share equation for each factor is
Si =+ mY+I3FilnF +j3jj lnP1. (2)
J
To take advantage of the additional information about the parameters appearing
in the share equations, (1) and (2) are jointly estimated below using iterated
seemingly unrelated regressions. One share equation must be omitted to prevent
the variance-covariance matrix of the error terms in (1) and (2) from being
singular. Iterated seemingly unrelated regression produces maximum likelihood
estimates which are invariant to the choice of which share equation is dropped.
Unions influence construction costs by raising the price of labor and,
potentially, changing the cost function parameters. If union work rules or
craft jurisdictions make union labor less productive, the entire cost function
shifts upward for any given level of The building trades unions also have
beneficial effects on productivity, mainly through their effects on training
(via apprenticeships), search and screening costs (via hiring halls), and6
management (via shock effects).4All of these factors would shift the cost
function downward for any given level of P.
Christensen and Greene define economies of scale (EOS) as
EOS =1-alnC/amy.




Union-nonunion differences in EOS can be calculated by estimatingay, /3yy, /3YF
and /3j separately for union and nonunion projects.
Why might one expect such differences? The most important factor is that
unionism can lower the cost of large projects through organizing what would
otherwise be a casual labor market. Union hiring halls provide large supplies
of skilled labor on relatively short notice, something a single contractormay
be unable to find on his own. The union also screens prospective workers,
reducing qualitative uncertainty in a market where short term employer-employee
relationships predominate. This lowers costs by reducing the amount of
managerial and clerical labor needed to recruit and screen workers, it also
reduces the cost of turnover and absenteeism, since replacements can be
quickly found. If union contractors' recruiting and screening costs increase
less rapidly with project size than those of nonunion contractors, this can
result in a union cost advantage in larger projects.
In addition union hiring halls reduce uncertainty about the quantity of
available labor, which can also result in economies of scale. Without such
uncertainty management can plan large projects on a more ambitious, tighter
schedule. This reduces the cost of maintaining materials inventories and
renting capital equipment. If the project is expected to be completed more
rapidly, the anticipated cost of borrowing to meet expenses over the course
of the project is also reduced. Since such uncertainty will bepresent only in7
large projects, this will result in a further union cost advantage for such
projects.
Interview evidence indicates that these economies give union contractors a
significant edge over their nonunion competitors. In a survey of nonunion
residential contractors in Erie County, N. Y. ,Foster[1973] found, "In most
cases, the inability to recruit sufficient help required some change in the
firm's normal operations, such as working overtime and weekends, refusing jobs
or running them longer than originally planned, or having the employer do the
work himself" [p. 1074]. Bourdon and Levitt [1980] reached even stronger
conclusions in their interviews with union and nonunion contractors in eight
large SMSAs. They concluded that the major disadvantage to the open-shop
sector was "the lack of access to an external labor pool of workers with
predictable wages and skills which would enable more firms to bid on
larger-scale work" [p. 54].
Another factor which may give union contractors an advantage over nonunion
competition in large projects is experience. Until recently the open shop was
concentrated in residential and small commercial projects. Managers whose
experience was previously confined to projects which could be completed in
three months are unlikely to be able to move into projects lasting one or two
years and be equally efficient. Such a union cost advantage would only be
temporary, but it may very well have been present in the period from which the
data come, the early and middle l970s.
Union work rules are a final factor contributing to union-nonunion
differences in economies of scale in construction. Bourdon and Levitt [1980,
pp.64-65] have argued that the constraints imposed by union work rules on
efficient factor allocation are less likely to be binding on large projects.
For instance, ironworkers' contracts usually specify minimum crew sizes. If8
the contract is enforced on a small job, the result will be overstaffing. On
a large project, the provision will be irrelevant. Any union cost disadvantage
associated with restrictive work rules should diminish with increasing project
size. Of course, this factor alone would not make union costs lower than
nonunion costs at any output level.
To test for union-nonunion differences in the cost function parameters the
translog system is estimated both over the pooled sample and over the union and
nonunion samples separately. The hypothesis that the union and nonunion
coefficients are equal is tested by examining the likelihood ratio
A =(/5Yn1/'2,where determinant of the disturbance covariance matrix
for the pooled specification, g =determinantof the covariance matrix
obtained from the specification with separate union and nonunion coefficients,
and n =thenumber of buildings in the sample. Test statistics are derived
from -2lnA, which is distributed as chi-squared with degrees of freedomequal
to the number of restrictions being tested. Results for a specification where
only a0 varies by union status are also reported below.
Three other sets of restrictions were examined. The production function
corresponding to the cost system is almost homothetic (isoquants for variable
inputs have the same slope along a ray from the origin) if /9Yi =0.An almost
homothetic production function is homogeneous (constant elasticity of cost with
respect to output) if f3yy =0.The homogeneity hypothesis is nested within the
homotheticity hypothesis, but both are unrelated to the unitary elasticity of
substitution hypothesis.
The translog variable profit function is written
mit= a0+ Ea lnP + .5 E/3jjlnP1lnP (3)
i ij
+ aF lnF + •5FF (lnF)2 + E/3FilnFlnP,9
where ir =profitsand P prices of variable inputs and output (iL, M, K,
Y).6 Once again symmetry and homogeneity restrictions are imposed.7
Hotelling's lemma states that the partial derivatives of the profit function
with respect to input prices are input demand functions. Formally,
a/8P1 =-Xi.In logarithmic terms, this becomes
81nr/0lnP = ai+ lnF+>/9jjlnPj. (4)
J
Also, the partial derivative of (4) with respect to the price of output is the
output supply function. Either the supply equation or one of the three input
share equations must be deleted from the system because the dependent variables
sum to 1. Maximum likelihood estimates which are invariant to whether the
output supply or one of the input demand equations is dropped are obtained by
estimating (3) and (4) jointly using iterated seemingly unrelated
regressions. The impact of unions on efficiency can be determined by comparing
all the parameters in (3) and (4) at different ranges of P1 or by allowing a0
to vary by union status.
A key assumption behind the profit function approach is that output prices
are determined competitively. As I will explain more fully below, the results
for cost, profit, and price for the school and hospital samples do not seem to
be consistent with this assumption, making the results uninterpretable in terms
of technical efficiency. Application of the profit function approach to the
question of how unions affect technical efficiency must await the arrivalof a
more appropriate data set.10
IV.DATA
Three samples of buildings are examined: 83 commercial office buildings
(64 union, 19 nonunion), 68 elementary and secondary school buildings (57
union. 11 nonunion), and 44 hospitals and nursing homes (36 union, 8 nonunion).
The characteristics of these data sets are discussed in Allen [1986a, b].
Different information on capital expenditures was provided in the surveys.
In the school survey, each contractor for each project was asked to provide the
rental cost, the allowance by the contractor for owned equipment, or the
equivalent of rental cost for each type of equipment. In addition, the
number of hours operated is also reported for each. The sum of all capital
equipment expenditures for all contractors on a particular project is used here
as the capital cost measure for schools. The price of capital is obtained by
dividing this figure by capital hours. In the office building and hospital
surveys each contractor provided equipment expenditure information
(depreciation or rental cost), as well as the interest expenses. The sum of
these expenses for all contractors for a particular office building is the
capital cost measure for this sample. Offsite capital (e.g. ,structures,
office furniture and equipment) is not reported for either sample.
Since capital hours are not reported for the office building sample, a
capital price variable had to be constructed from other data sources. The
variable used below is the rate of return estimated from the 1972 Census of
Construction Industries for the Census division in which each project was
located. Values of this variable for smaller geographic units could not be
constructed because individual states or SNSAs are not identified in the data
to protect the confidentiality of contractors and subcontractors. This
introduces some measurement error bias into the analysis, the magnitude of
which will be assessed below.11
Earnings and hours are reported for all onsite work. Almost all of this
represents production labor. The only nonproduction categories reported are
clerical workers (e.g., timekeepers), professional and technical workers (e.g.,
draftsmen, engineers), and foremen. Issues concerning the separability of
labor into smaller aggregates are ignored here.
Fringe benefit costs are not reported. Since these costs are much larger
in the union sector, labor costs are underreported by a much greater extent for
union than nonunion contractors.8 To correct for this, I add estimated fringe
benefits to labor costs for union contractors only. This increases the
likelihood that the results will show higher costs in the union sector. Fringe
benefits are paid on an hourly basis in union construction. I assume that
fringe benefits equal 14.6 percent of earnings, a figure derived from 1972
national averages of wages and benefit costs in union contracts for all
occupations in 68 cities.9 The price of labor equals earnings plus estimated
fringes divided by hours.
The price of materials variable is derived from the 1973 Dodge Manual for
Building Construction Pricing and Scheduling. The Dodge Manual reports a
materials price index for 80 cities. These were aggregated into nine indices
for each of the Census divisions, using 1972 construction employment in each
city as weights. Since this index varies much more across rather than within
regions, this aggregation is unlikely to seriously contaminate the results.
Square footage is used as the output measure in both samples. Differences
in building characteristics such as type of frame or height are ignored. In
previous work examining production functions over these samples in Allen
{l986a, b], these variables had relatively little effect on estimates of the
union-nonunion productivity difference. Other output measures are available12
for the school sample (student capacity and classrooms) and for the hospital
sample (beds), but these are highly correlated with square footage.1-°
Fixed inputs are not reported in any of the three surveys. Assuming that
offsite labor and capital vary directly with the size of the general
contractor, this variable seems to be-a reasonable proxy. In the office
building sample the 1974 dollar volume of business in private office building
construction for the general contractor is reported along with the share of
private office building construction in his 1974 total dollar volume. The
ratio of these two variables equals 1972 total dollar volume and is used in the
cost function model as a proxy for fixed inputs for that sample.1-1- The school
sample reports classrooms built by the general contractor in 1972 and the share
of 1972 dollar volume in school construction in 1972 total dollar volume. The
number of classrooms [s used in the cost function model as a proxy for fixed
offsite inputs in the school sample. No similar proxies for fixed inputs are
available for the hospital and nursing homes sample. The effects of omitting
this variable will be assessed on the other two data sets.
V. COST FUNCTION RESULTS
The mean cost per square foot by union status and building size for office
building, school, and hospital construction is reported in Table 1.The size
categories are defined so that each sample of buildings is divided into three
groups which have almost the same number of observations. Nonunion
observations are concentrated in the smallest group in each sample.
Across buildings of all size categories, cost per square foot is 4 percent
lower in office building construction when union labor is used. Union-nonunion
differences in cost per square foot vary with building size. Cost per square
foot [s 4 percent higher [n the union sector for buildings in the smallest size13
category. In both sectors cost per square foot is lower in the middle size
category, but the decrease in average costs is much greater for the nonunion
sector. As a result, union labor is considerably more costly (44 percent) in
buildings in the middle size category. When building size increases above
75,000 square feet, average cost rises for both union and nonunion labor. The
cost increase is much greater for nonunion labor, resulting in a cost advantage
for the union sector. Average costs are 23 percent lower for the union
buildings in this size category.
Costs in the nonunion sector are cheaper than costs in the union sector in
each of the size categories of school and hospital construction. Overall,
costs are 48 percent higher for schools and 36 percent higher for hospitals
built with union crews. In the school sample, the difference is widest (52
percent) in the small and middle size categories and is smallest (37 percent)
for schools in the largest size category. A similar pattern is present in the
hospital sample, as the difference narrows from 63 percent in the smallest size
category to 27 and 19 percent in the middle and largest size categories. Even
though union costs are always greater, the narrowing of union-nonunion cost
differences with increasing building size is consistent with the pattern
observed for office buildings.
Two cost function specifications were examined, one where the intercept of
the cost function varies by union status and the other where all coefficients
vary by union status. In the hospital sample, homotheticity and homogeneity
with respect to output could not be rejected, so these restrictions were
imposed. No restrictions are imposed on the other two samples. The union
coefficients (S.E.) are reported below:
Commercial Office Buildings .200
(.105)
Elementary and Secondary Schools .161
(.079)14
Hospitals and Nursing Homes .113
(.146)
These coefficients show costs are lower for union contractors in office
building construction, but in school and hospital construction union
contractors have higher costs, holding input prices and output constant. The
hypothesis that the union intercept is identical to the nonunion intercept is
rejected at the 95 percent confidence level for the school sample and the 94
percent confidence level for the office building sample.
To implement the second approach, the hypothesis that the union and nonunion
coefficients in (1) and (2) are equal must be tested. Because there are only
8 nonunion observations in the hospital sample, this approach is not applied to
that data set as there are only 10 degrees of freedom in the least restrictive
specification. The results for nonunion schools in the least restrictive
specifications should also be viewed with caution, as there are as few as 18
degrees of freedom for that sample.
Table 2 reports the results of likelihood ratio tests of the hypothesis of
equal union and nonunion coefficients for both samples under a variety of
restrictions, along with tests of the homotheticity, homogeneity, and unitary
elasticity of substitution restrictions within the union and nonunion
samples. Complete results for the least restrictive specification are reported
in the appendix. In the school sample, the hypothesis of equal union and
nonunion coefficients can be rejected at the 95 or 99 percent confidence level
in all specifications. Union-nonunion differences in the parameter estimates
are less pronounced in the office building sample, except when the restriction
/3j =0is imposed. The main reason for this is the relatively minor union-
nonunion difference in the /3jjestimates.The hypothesis that /3j =0in the
union equation cannot be rejected. Once this restriction is imposed, the union15
and nonunion coefficients become much more distinct from each other. However,
when the homogeneity restriction is reimposed, the distinction comes close to
vanishing again. Thus, the key difference between the union and nonunion
coefficients in the office building sample is the relationship of cost to
output.
12
Assumptions have to be made about factor prices, output levels, and fixed
inputs before making any comparisons of economies of scale or costs. As
there was no correlation between factor prices and building size in any of the
samples, the mean factor prices for union projects are inserted in the union
equations and the mean factor prices for nonunion projects in the nonunion
equations. Different sets of means are used for office buildings and schools.
This assumption places the union projects at an immediate cost disadvantage
because of higher union wages.
Focusing on a single output level in each sample is potentially misleading,
given the wide range of building sizes in all of the samples. Because
homogeneity of degree one of the cost function with respect to output is easily
rejected for all samples except nonunion schools, it is quite possible that
union labor may be cost effective in some output ranges but not in others.
Rather than focusing on a single summary statistic, cost functions and
economies of scale functions are reported in Table 3 and Figures 1 and 2. The
ranges of output levels where the cost of union (nonunion) projects is less
than that of nonunion (union) projects, and where economies of scale prevail
are also reported. The mean value of fixed inputs for union buildings in each
sample is used in both the union and nonunion equations for that sample.
Because of the possibility of errors in measuring fixed inputs, two sets of
estimates are reported: one where the fixed input variable is included in the
model and another where all fixed input coefficients are restricted to zero.16
A. Economies of Scale.The most noticeable difference in the parameter
estimates between the union and nonunion buildings is the rate at which costs
change at different output levels. In nonunion construction diseconomies of
scale first appear at lower output levels and increase more rapidly with output
than in the union sector. Diseconomies of scale first appear in nonunion
office buildings at 26 to 28 thousand square feet of space. They disappear in
nonunion schools at 41,606 square feet in the model including fixed inputs and
at 80,178 square feet in the model without fixed inputs. Economies of scale
are present in union office building construction over a much larger range of
output levels than in nonunion office building construction- -through67 to 69
thousand square feet. More importantly, the rate at which costs rise with
output is much lower in the union sector. The second derivatives (in logs) of
cost with respect to output are about four times larger for nonunion office
buildings than union office buildings. The pattern of economies of scale over
various output levels in union school construction is the reverse of that in
the other three samples. Diseconomies of scale are present until school size
reaches 78 to 86 thousand square feet in the union sector. Economies of scale
are present at all higher output levels.
The evidence that costs increase much more rapidly with building size in
the nonunion sector is consistent with the theory and anecdotal evidence cited
in Section III regarding the disadvantages nonunion contractors face in large
projects. The exact source of these economies cannot be isolated, but evidence
on the ratio of overtime to total hours suggests union hiring halls are a
contributing factor. Working overtime is the usual managerial response in the
short run to situations where labor supply is inadequate. If hiring halls
contribute to economies of scale, there would be less overtime in union
projects, with the difference widening with project size. To examine this17
possibility each sample is split into groups of buildings above and below
50,000 square feet in size. Union buildings in the office building sample
which are larger than the largest nonunion building (225,000 sq. ft.) are
reported separately. The percentages (S.D.) of overtime hours are:
Commercial Elementary and
office buildings secondary schools
Union Nonunion Union Nonunion
Less than 50,000 sq. ft. .40 .36 .37 .54
(.92) (.83) (.68) (.59)
More than 50,000 sq. ft. .56 2.61 1.09 1.90
(.68) (1.96) (1.72) (2.64)
More than 225,000 sq. ft. 1.84 -
(1.43)
In both samples there is little difference in overtime ratios between union and
nonunion contractors for smaller buildings. Overtime ratios increase sub-
stantially among the larger buildings, especially for nonunion contractors.
They used 75 percent more overtime in larger schools and 366 percent more over-
time in larger office buildings. There is also much greater variance in over-
time among the nonunion subcontractors in the larger buildings. Although
these overtime differences in larger buildings can account for no more than a 1
percent cost difference in these samples, these results are consistent with
the effectiveness of hiring halls.
B. Cost Comparisons. In office building construction, costs are lower when
union labor is used in buildings with more than 72 to 74 thousand square feet
of space. The gap in costs widens considerably with increasing building size
because of the greater economies of scale under unionism. The cost function
coefficients also imply that union contractors have a comparative advantage in18
producing projects with less than 6,000 square feet, but the magnitude of
these estimated differences is quite small.
Are these results attributable to unionism or to the greater average size
of buildings in the union sample? The largest nonunion office building in the
sample has 225,000 square feet of space. There are 16 union buildings in the
sample with more square footage. If the cost function for the smaller union
buildings is quite different from that for the largest ones, it is possible
that these union-nonunion cost comparisons are misleading. To test this the
cost system was re-estimated over all union buildings with 200,000 square feet
or less of space. The key results were basically unchanged. Construction
costs are lower under unionism in this restricted sample in all buildings with
more than 77,964 square feet of space.
Although these cost differences are economically significant, the small
size of the sample raises the question of their statistical significance. Let
C represent costs for union (i=u) and nonunion (i=n) projects. The standard
error of 1nC -lnCncan be estimated under the assumption that cov(lnCu,lnCn)
=0and used to construct a 95 percent confidence interval of the range of
output where lnC =lnCn.In the specification where fixed inputs were
included, the hypothesis of no cost difference could be rejected for all office
buildings with more than 167,042 square feet. In the specification where fixed
inputs are excluded, it could be rejected for all office buildings with more
than 153,430 square feet. While this range is considerably smaller than that
reported in Table 2, the key result of greater union efficiency in larger
buildings still holds. It should also be noted that the range where lnCu >
lnCat the 95 percent confidence level is more limited as well: below 31,382
square feet when fixed inputs are included and below 35,490 when fixed inputs
are excluded.19
School construction costs are much higher in the union sector. In the
specification where fixed inputs are included, union contractors are less
efficient except for schools with more than 197,008 square feet. When the fixed
input coefficients are restricted to zero, union costs are greater than
nonunion costs in buildings with up to 293,021 square feet, which is larger
than the largest building in the nonunion sample. Further, once standard
errors of lnC -lnCare estimated, the hypothesis that lnC <lnCcan be
rejected throughout the range of the nonunion sample whether fixed inputs are
included in the model or not.
All but one of the 11 nonunion schools in the sample were built in the
South, which could make the above comparisons misleading. The above results
could actually reflect North-South differences in construction costs rather
than union-nonunion differences. To test this possibility, the translog cost
system was re-estimated for the union and nonunion samples over Southern
schools only. The results showed union costs to be above nonunion costs in
Southern schools at all output levels)-3
To assess the bias resulting from measurement error in the capital price
variable in the office building sample, the ratio of equipment costs to
equipment hours was replaced in the cost function model for the school sample
by the rate of return variable used as the capital price proxy for office
buildings. This had no effect on the main cost function results--school
construction costs remained higher at all levels of output for union
contractors. Thus it does not seem likely that the results for office
buildings have been seriously biased by measurement error in the capital price
variable.20
VI. PROFITS AND PRICES
The greater costs of union contractors in the school and hospital samples
must be absorbed by the contractors in the form of lower profits, passed on to
the buyer in the form of higher prices, or both. This section analyzes
evidence on profits and prices to determine who pays for the higher cost of
union labor in these two samples.
Profit in each sample is defined as the difference between the value of
thr-r1rt-ni-rt-'1- frr i-H r-,t-i rh114 1 d--no-,-r,d f+,c 11mrftkc rc,i-c 1
materials,and capital. The ratio of profit to the value of the contract is a
useful summary measure for making comparisons across union and nonunion
buildings within a sample and across different types of construction. Although
the rate of return on equity is a more desirable measure, this must be
calculated over a given period of time encompassing a number of projects; it
cannot be calculated from data pertaining to a single project. These ratios
are reported below by union status for each of three samples:
Union mean Nonunion mean
Commercial office buildings 21.6 21.8
Elementary and secondary schools 20.2 20.3
Hospitals and nursing homes 24.8 23.4
In all three samples, the mean ratio of profits to the value of the contract
is almost identical for union and nonunion contractors. This is a very
striking piece of evidence, especially in light of the fact that estimated
fringe benefits are not included in the labor costs of nonunion contractors.
This assumption biases the profits of nonunion contractors upward. When
estimated fringe benefits are omitted from the labor costs of union
contractors, the union profit rate increases by four percentage points. Under
this assumption a t-test of the means finds them significantly different from
each other at the 11 percent confidence level for office buildings and21
hospitals and at the 4 percent confidence level for schools. Thissuggests
the ratio of profits to contract amount for union contractors isslightly
higher than that for nonunion contractors.
How can profits for union contractors in school and hospital construction
be greater than or equal to those of nonunion contractors in light of the
higher costs per square foot? The answer is fairly obvious- -the priceper
square foot is higher in the projects built by union contractors in those two
samples. The following union coefficients were obtained from hedonic price
equations estimated over each of the three samples:'4
Sample Union coefficient (SE.)
Commercial office buildings .004
(.099)
Elementary and secondary schools .178
(.081)
Hospitals and nursing homes .078
(.112)
Holding square footage and other building characteristics constant, the
contract amount is 19 percent higher in schools and 8 percent higher in
hospitals built by union contractors. Although the coefficient for hospitals
is not estimated very precisely, it certainly reconciles the difference between
the effects of unions on costs and on mean profit rates for that sample.
This naturally leads to another question--how can union contractors receive
a higher price for the same school or hospital project than nonunion
contractors? The answer seems to be geographic market segmentation created by
prevailing wage laws. The union contractors in the school and hospital samples
seem to face no nonunion competition; the nonunion contractors, no union
competition. All of the nonunion schools and hospitals are built in the South
Atlantic, East South Central, West South Central, and West North Central
divisions where percent union tends to be very low. Even though union projects22
were present in all nine divisions in both samples, of the six states in which
nonunion schools are located, only one state contained any union schools. None
of the nonunion hospitals were located in states which had any union hospitals
in the sample.
No such market segmentation is present in the office building sample.
Nonunion office buildings are located in six of the nine Census divisions, the
exceptions being the West North Central, East South Central, and the Pacific
divisions. Union projects were observed in all nine divisions. Out of the
11 states in which nonunion office buildings were observed, seven also
contained union office buildings.
A plausible explanation for the presence of market segmentation in the
school and hospital samples and its absence in the office building sample
is prevailing wage legislation. Minimum wages for most of the school sample
and all of the hospital sample are determined by the Davis-Bacon Act or state
prevailing wage laws. As a general rule these minimum wages are well above the
federal minimum wage and in many cases equal (but never exceed) the union
wage.1-5 This constraint binds nonunion contractors only and thereby reduces
their ability to compete for projects in the public sector. Since these laws
have no direct effect on private sector work, there is no reason to expect such
segmentation in the office building sample.
VII. CONCLUSION
The results of this paper support a "competitive union" model of trade
union behavior in the office building sample and a "monopoly union" model in
the school and hospital samples. Since the same unions appear in all three
samples, the remaining issue is to account for this pattern of union behavior.
This boils down to two questions: why do union contractors in school and23
hospital construction have greater costs and how is entry by nonunion
contractors prevented in these cases?
A plausible explanation for the greater costs of union contractors in school
and public hospital construction is that government officials have little
incentive to produce buildings at lower than budgeted cost. The frequent use
of one shot sealed bid auctions to let contracts exacerbates matters by
facilitating collusive arrangements.16 Private hospital owners may also lack
such incentives since they receive most of their revenue from governments and
insurance companies rather than the individuals who use their services. In
contrast commercial office building owners can threaten to delay, cancel, or
relocate a project. They can also negotiate with individual bidders for cost
reductions since they are not forced to award contracts to the lowest bidder in
a one shot sealed bid auction. The net result is that contractors and unions
stand to collect rents in school and hospital construction, but not in
commercial office building construction.
Nonunion contractors should appropriate any rents for themselves by
producing at minimum cost. Unions may instead choose to distribute rents in
the form of increased on-the-job leisure or job opportunities. Although this
is not the most efficient method of rent sharing, other approaches (higher
wages, side payments) would signal the presence of rents to outsiders and thus
may not be a stable solution. Political factors within the union may also
dictate such a solution, since the least skilled union members may already be
priced out of private sector work. This explanation can account for the
greater cost of union contractors in school and hospital construction. Profits
are equalized by competition within the union and nonunion sectors and by the
threat of entry into either sector.24
Whydon'tnonunion contractors go after this business? Even at union wage
rates they might be able to produce these projects at lower cost if union
contractors are hiring excess amounts of labor. One possible answer is that
unions take this threat into account when deciding how much excess labor should
be hired. If (1) the prevailing wage laws constrain nonunion contractors from
producing at minimum cost and (2) they are less efficient when forced to pay
union wages than union contractors would have been if they produced at minimum
cost, unions have a wedge which can be used to pad the payrolls while
simultaneously preventing the entry of nonunion competition. As long as
markets remain segmented, union contractors can maintain profit rates by
passing the higher costs to project owners in the form of higher prices.
Another possibility is that nonunion contractors are reluctant for personnel
reasons to bid on projects where they would have to overpay their workers.
Worker morale could deteriorate if employees receive different wage rates for
identical types of work, resulting in a decline in overall profitability.
This paper has two major implications. First, in the case of large commer-
cial office buildings, union contractors can compete effectively with nonunion
contractors because of greater economies of scale. Second, reduced efficiency
results when the building trades unions operate in an environment where
managers lack incentives to minimize costs. Although further work is clearly
necessary, these findings point to a more general model where the behavior of
unions fits the framework of the "competitive union" model when product markets
are competitive while the "monopoly union" model best describes union behavior
in other settings.
North Carolina State University and
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NOTES
1. Studies examining the effect of unions on productivity are summarized
in Freeman and Medoff (1984) which reports complete references.
2. The only previous study to examine the effect of unions on cost is Salkever
(1982), who found operating expenses per inpatient day were 6 percent
higher in unionized hospitals. The effect of unions on profits has been
examined in Freeman (1983), Ruback and Zimmerman (1984), Clark (1984), and
Salinger (1984). All of these studies find unionism to be associated with
lower profits.
3. The discussion below follows closely that in Christensen and Greene (1976).
4. These arguments and supporting references are found in Allen (1984 and
1986b)
5. The possibility of strikes means that unions can also increase uncertainty
about the quantity of available labor. Strikes arise in the building
trades not only as a result of failure to agree to a new contract, but also
as a consequence of jurisdictional disputes among different unions. This
type of uncertainty is present in all projects, regardless of size, so it
should shift only the intercept of the cost function and have no effect on
the relationship between cost and output.
6. The properties of the profit function are more fully discussed in Diewert
(1974) and Lau (1978). For empirical applications see Yotopoulos and
Lau (1973), Trosper (1978), Sidhu and Baanante (1981), and Antle (1984).
7. If the actual magnitude of fixed inputs equals the desired magnitude,
the regularity conditions for a variable profit function require profits to
be homogeneous of degree one with respect to fixed inputs, implying aF =1
and FF =0.
8. Evidence showing that the effect of unions on fringe benefit expenditures is
larger (in percentage terms) than the effect of unions on wages is reported
in Freeman (1981).
9. This figure was obtained from U. S. Department of Labor (1974).
1O.Simple correlation coefficients for each pair of these output measures
in the school sample are:
Square footage-student capacity .874
Square footage-total classrooms .887
Student capacity-total classrooms .937
In the hospital sample the correlation coefficient between beds and square
footage is .691. All correlation coefficients are significant at the .0001
level.26
ll.The general contractor did not report 1974 dollar volume of office building
construction in five cases. Imputed values in these cases were obtained
from regressions estimated over the other 78 projects in the sample.
Details are available upon request.
12.To test whether ay and /3yy differed significantly from each other by
union status, union interaction terms for these two parameters were
estimated along with a union intercept term. No restrictions were imposed
on homogeneity, homotheticity, or demand elasticities. The coefficients
(S.E.) of the parameters which were allowed to vary by union status are as
follows:
a0 18.446 ay -2.090 /3yy .405
(5.857) (1.180) (.120)
Union -11.873 ay *Union 2.429 y-y*Union .250
(6.179) (1.217) (.119)
Each of the union interaction coefficients is significantly different from
zero at a 6 percent or lower confidence level.
13.The cost functions at the respective sample means obtained over observations
in the South in a specification with the fixed input coefficients restricted
to zero but without any restrictions on homogeneity, homotheticity, or
demand elasticities are as follows:
Sample Cost Function
Union lnC =.251(lnY)2-4.677 lnY +34.755
Nonunion lnC =.096(lnY)2-1.202 lnY +15.110
Union costs were greater than nonunion costs at all output levels.
l4.The hedonic price equation specifications are reported in more detail in
Allen (1985).
l5.Allen (1983) discusses how the Labor Department sets prevailing wages under
the Davis-Bacon Act and estimates how they affect federal construction
costs. The paper shows that there is no longer an automatic tendency in the
Labor Department to set prevailing wages at union scale, except in
nonresidential building construction. Since both schools and hospitals fall
into this category, however, it seems reasonable to conclude that Davis-
Bacon has contributed to the geographic market segmentation observed in
these two samples without contradicting the main result of this other
paper.
16.Stigler (1983, Ch. 5) has argued that this approach increases the chances
that a price-fixing arrangement will be successful because parties cannot
secretly underbid their co-conspirators. The recent spate of bid-rigging
convictions in highway construction suggests this model has some explanatory
power.27
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Table 1. Cost per square foot in office building, school, and hospital
construction, by building size and union status
Sample Union Nonunion Union ÷ nonunion
Office Buildings
Entire sample 19.7 20.5 0.96
(7.8) (8.0)
16,000 sq. ft. or less 21.6 20.8 1.04
(6.7) (8.0)
16,001-75,000 sq. ft. 17.9 12.5 1.43
(7.0) (1.1)
More than 75,000 sq. ft. 20.5 26.7 0.77
(8.9) (5.3)
Elementary and Secondary Schools
Entire sample 20.2 13.6 l.48***
(5.1) (2.8)
50,000 sq. ft. or less 19.3 12.7 l.52***
(4.7) (1.8)
50,001-100,000 sq. ft. 21.2 13.9 1.52***
(5.3) (3.8)
More than 100,000 sq. ft. 20.1 14.7 1.37
(5.2) (1.7)
Hospitals and Nursing Homes
Entire sample 42.7 31.4 1.36**
(14.0) (9.7)
60,000 sq. ft. or less 46.9 28.7 l.63**
(17.2) (5.9)
60,001-200,000 sq. ft. 44.6 35.1 1.27
(9.9) (15.5)
MOre than 200,000 sq. ft. 36.7 30.9 1.19
(12.8) (N/A)
Note: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
*Significant at 10 percent confidence levels using two-tailed t-test
**Significant at 5 percent confidence levels using two-tailed t-test
***Significant at 1 percent confidence levels using two-tailed t-test30
Table 2. Log likelihood ratio tests of cost function restrictions by union Status and of equality of union and non
coefficients for office building and school construction
Tests of cost functionrestrictions
Tests of equality of union
and nonunion coefficients
under various restrictions
Commercial Elementary and Commercial
Degreesoffice buildings secondary schools Degrees office Elementary
Restrictions offreedomUnion Nonunion Union Nonunion offreedombuildings secondary
None - - - - - 15 22.12 36.12***
Homotheticity 2 6.16* 5.32* 12.26*** 4.38 13 2L40* 25.77**
Homothetici ty
and homogeneity 3 1557 20.56*** 14.50*** 5.73 12 12.40 25.83**
Unitary a 3 4.02 11.89*** 23.92*** 1.44 12 33.83*** 4743***
Unitary a
and homotheticity 5 10.92 23.29*** 33.20*** 5.82 10 24.50*** 3755***
Unitary a,
homothet ic ity,
and homogeneity 6 22.05***38.80*** 35.18*** 10.43 9 1647* 3457***
Note: The figures reported here are -21nX, which is distributed X2.
*= rejectedat 90% confidence level.
**= rejectedat 95% confidence level.
=rejectedat 99% confidence level.31
Table 3.Costs and economies of scale for office building and school construction, by union status
Elementary and
Commercial office buildings secondary schools
Union Nonunion Union Nonunion
Range of output
in sampLe (sq. ft.) 3650-1700000 3000-225000 21000-364000 19531-280000
Model including
fixed inputs
1. inC .078(lnY)2-.7391nY .281(lnY)2-4.7431ny -.083(lnY)2+2/871lnY .284(lnY)'-5.052
+12.448 +31.890 -7.505 +34.541
2. EOS 1.739-.156LnY 5.748-.562lnY -1.871+.1661nY 6.O52-.5691nY
3. Range of output
where cost is
lower Y <5213;Y>72403 5213 <Y<72403 Y >197008 Y <197008
4. Range of output
where EOS >0 Y <69335 Y <27667 Y >78511 Y <41606
Model excluding
fixed inputs
1.LnC .040(LnY)2+.llllny 186(tnY)2-2.7921nY -.091(lnY)2+3.056LnY .170(lnY)2-2.8281ny
+7.748 +21.943 -8.626 +24.084
2. E0S .889-.O8OlnY 3.792- .373lnY -2.056+.l8llnY 3.828- .339lnY
3. Range of output
where cost is
Lower Y <5855;Y>73792 5855 <Y<73792 Y <21078;Y>293021 21078 <Y<293021
4. Range of output
where EOS >0 Y <66970 Y <26004 Y >85734 Y <80178Figure 1. Cost functions for union and nonunion commercial office
buildings.
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Table A. Translogcost system estimates with fixed inputs
Elementary and
Commercialofficebuildings secondary schools
Pooled Union Nonunion Pooled Union Nonunion
Parameter
estimates:
7.378 6.610 13.382 -3.667 -8.371 19.981
(2.244) (2.945) (6.264) (6.334) (6.825) (44.913)
ay .192 .341 -2.198 1.995 2.847 -2.958
( ( L7(1 9/ 1 iQfl 971(1r JOs\ \._-_/
/3yy .156 .156 .562 -.087 -.166 .568
(.047) (.053) (.176) (.114) (.120) (1.304)
aM .922 .883 .481 1.089 1.209 .646
(.092) (.200) (.199) (.090) (.118) (.465)
aK
-.060 -.155 .066 .0002 .0002 -.005
(.056) (.106) (.066) (.026) (.026) (.132)
.142 .097 .217 .141 .174 .138
(.048) (.092) (.076) (.023) (.042) (.150)
.012 .013 -.087 .004 -.0002 .028
(.030) (.041) (.034) (.005) (.007) (.027)
-.021 -.044 .072 .005 .005 -.001
(.026) (.032) (.030) (.002) (.002) (.011)
.011 .007 .034 -.023 -.028 .016
(.007) (.009) (.020) (.008) (.008) (.045)
/3YK .006 .008 .002 -.005 .003 .015
(.003) (.004) (.006) (.002) (.002) (.013)
aF
-.090 -.145 .689 .272 .349 1.623
(.287) (.352) (.775) (.549) (.544) (8.474)
PFF .044 .054 .052 -.046 -.054 .875
(.029) (.032) (.100) (.088) (.088) (1.327)
I3FM
-.009 -.009 -.007 .007 .009 .012
(.006) (.007) (.010) (.007) (.008) (.059)
I9FK
-.001 -.002 .003 -.004 -.002 -.023























Materials .572 .559 .611 .582 .571 .645
Capital .040 .041 .034 .026 .026 .026




























N 83 64 19 68 57 11
Note: All estimates were obtained by jointly estimating a cost equation, a
materials share equation, and a capital share equation by iterated
seemingly unrelated regressions, using the SAS SYSNLIN procedure.
Standard errors are reported in parentheses.